The first-ever multivolume treatment of the issues in legal philosophy and general jurisprudence, from both a theoretical and a historical perspective. The work is aimed at jurists as well as legal and practical philosophers. Edited by the renowned theorist Enrico Pattaro and his team, this book is a classical reference work that would be of great interest to legal and practical philosophers as well as to jurists and legal scholar at all levels. The work is divided in two parts. The (...) theoretical part, consisting of five volumes, covers the main topics of the contemporary debate; the historical part, consisting of six volumes, accounts for the development of legal thought from ancient Greek times through the twentieth century. The entire set will be completed with an index. Volume 6: A History of the Philosophy of Law from the Ancient Greeks to the Scholastics 2nd revised edition, edited by Fred D. Miller, Jr. and Carrie-Ann Biondi Volume 6 is the first of the Treatise’s historical volumes and is dedicated to the philosophers’ philosophy of law from ancient Greece to the 16th century. The volume thus begins with the dawning of legal philosophy in Greek and Roman philosophical thought and then covers the birth and development of European medieval legal philosophy, the influence of Judaism and the Islamic philosophers, the revival of Roman and Christian canon law, and the rise of scholastic philosophy in the late Middle Ages, which paved the way for early-modern Western legal philosophy. This second, revised edition comes with an entirely new chapter devoted to the later Scholastics and an epilogue on the legacy of ancient and medieval thought for modern legal philosophy, as well as with updated references and indexes. (shrink)

The disagreement over whether Aristotle recognized rights in some form unavoidably involves disagreement over what rights are, and the theory of rights itself is still highly contested. There is no consensus concerning how " right'? is to be defined, how rights are to be theoretically grounded, or how rights theory is to be applied in particular circumstances. This is not, however, a good reason to dismiss the issue of whether there are rights in Aristotle: for Aristotle, like modern rights theorists, (...) is concerned about the moral and legal status of the individual within the community, and he expresses this in terms of claims of justice. The issue is worthy of study not only because it can lead to a deeper understanding of Aristotle's conceptions of justice and the common good, but also because it may shed valuable light on the theoretical foundations of human rights, since he offers a theory of political justice which is based on a metaphysical theory of human nature. (shrink)

DEBATE CONTINUES OVER WHETHER AN “Aristotelian philosophy of mind” is still credible. Recent commentators wonder whether Aristotle’s view lies somewhere in the constellation of modern theories of mind, or whether he might point to an uncharted theory. Because he viewed his own account as an alternative to both Platonic dualism and Presocratic materialism, moderns seeking a middle way between Cartesian dualism and reductionist physicalism have looked to Aristotle for inspiration. As Jonathan Barnes observes, “Philosophy of mind has for centuries been (...) whirled between a Cartesian Charybdis and a scientific Scylla: Aristotle has the look of an Odysseus.”. (shrink)

TheFederalist, written by in 1787-1788 in defense of the proposed constitution of the United States, endorses a fundamental principle of political legitimacy: namely, This essay argues that this principlemay be traced back to Plato. Part I of the essay seeks to show that Plato's Statesman offers a clearer understanding of the rule of reason than his more famous Republic, and it also indicates how this principle gave rise to the ideal of constitutionalism, which was adopted and reformulated by Aristotle, Polybius, (...) and Cicero, as well as moderns including Locke and Montesquieu. Part II argues that TheFederalist agrees with Plato when it argues that popular sovereignty must be tempered by the rule of reason. A proper distance should be maintained between the people and the actual exercise of power in order that political decisions be based on reason rather than passion. The people must therefore act through a federal system divided between national government and state governments, and these governments must themselves possess separated powers which control each other by means of checks and balances. Indeed, federalism itself may be viewed as a modern counterpart of Plato's which unites naturally disparate and opposed parts of the city-state into a concordant whole. In declaring, TheFederalist concedes that politics is the art of the possible. But statesmanship is not an exercise in pragmatism devoid of principles. Here shares Plato's vision of politics as a that is, an attempt to approximate the ideal of rational governance as far as possible in ordinary politics. (shrink)

A central idea in moral and political philosophy, 'autonomy' is generally understood as some form of self-governance or self-direction. Certain Stoics, modern philosophers such as Spinoza, and most importantly, Immanuel Kant, are among the great philosophers who have offered important insights on the concept. Some theorists analyze autonomy in terms of the self being moved by its higher-order desires. Others argue that autonomy must be understood in terms of acting from reason or from a sense of moral duty independent of (...) the passions. Autonomy seems closely related to the notion of freedom, but in what sense: freedom from coercion, freedom from psychological constraints, or freedom from material necessity? Various approaches to these and similar questions yield different implications for public policy. Is capitalism, social democracy or socialism more favorable to autonomy? The essays in this volume address these important questions. (shrink)

In Loren Lomasky's wry understatement, which serves as this book's motto, "A century that has witnessed the Holocaust and the Gulag is not one which can be aptly characterized as paying too much heed to basic rights". In opposition to twentieth-century statism, there arose libertarianism, a political philosophy committed to individual rights. Following the decline and collapse of the Soviet Union and other communist states and amid growing doubts about the welfare state, the editors and contributors to Liberty for the (...) 21st Century take the fin de siècle as an occasion for a new statement of libertarian theory, with the hope that it may become the dominant voice in the next century. (shrink)

As I look back, my career seems to have followed two intertwining paths: ancient Greek philosophy and modern public policy. This may seem puzzling, but I will try to explain how these diverse intellectual pursuits converged in my case to lead to a memorable journey. I will conclude with some remembrances of companions and friends who have helped me on the way.

A MAJOR THESIS OF CONTEMPORARY LIBERAL PHILOSOPHY is that its theory of justice, which incorporates strong rights to negative liberty, must be prior to and independent of a theory of the good. This priority is necessary, according to liberal theorists, in view of the requirement that any adequate theory accommodate a plurality of contending views of the good, no one of which is capable of eliciting public assent to it. Recent critics of liberalism have disputed this thesis, maintaining instead that (...) there is indeed an objective good, rather than a plurality of contending goods, which at least seriously compromises and possibly undermines the negative liberty with which liberals traditionally associated their theories. Variously called communitarians, virtue theorists, or republicans, these critics have presented an important challenge to contemporary liberalism whether of the individualist or welfare state variety. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Adam Smith and the Virtues of EnlightenmentFred D. Miller Jr.Charles L. Griswold. Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xiv + 412. Cloth, $59.95.For over a century, scholars have been vexed by the so-called "Adam Smith problem," which concerns the relationship between the two works which Smith published during his lifetime: The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) in 1759, and An (...) Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (WN) in 1776 (citations are to the Liberty Classics reprints of the Oxford University Press editions). Many have regarded them as discordant: while TMS is apparently concerned with classical ethics, WN seems to assume that humans are basically egoistic, although they can be directed toward the public good by means of the "invisible hand." It is tempting to view Smith as a transitional author: TMS is the swan song of virtue ethics, whereas WN is a pioneering work in a new tradition of political economy.Griswold challenges this temptation in this brilliant study, arguing that Smith had a coherent and integrated philosophical viewpoint encompassing TMS, WN, and other surviving writings. Griswold views Smith as offering a virtue ethics and "throwing in his lot with the ancient moralists" (65). He argues, "We cannot grasp Smith's diagnosis of and therapy for the modern age without devoting considerable attention to his analysis of the virtues (especially the virtue of justice) as well as to the theory of the emotions, of the impartial spectator, and of sympathy" (20). Smith tried to reconcile a traditional ethics with modern skepticism and the new values associated with commercial society and religious secularism. Griswold's book illuminates a wide range of themes in Smith's moral philosophy: his view of rhetoric, method, and system underlying TMS (chapter 1); sympathy and self-interest (chapter 2); moral psychology and the theory of the impartial spectator (chapter 3); Smith's skepticism and reservations about philosophy (chapter 4); virtue theory (chapter 5); justice (chapter 6); the relationship between TMS and WN (chapter 7); and nature versus artifice in ethics (chapter 8). The epilogue critically discusses whether Smith's moral theory falls into subjectivism, and whether [End Page 439] Smith goes too far in excluding philosophers such as Socrates from ordinary moral discourse.A brief review cannot do justice to Griswold's compelling interpretation, and I shall focus on his solution to "the old problem of how the moral theory and the political economy mesh" (21). Griswold argues, "Smith sees himself as synthesizing an ancient view about the nature of virtue with a modern approach to the problem of the source of moral value. Consequently the moral psychology (especially the notions of sympathy and the impartial spectator) and the virtue theory must be understood in light of each other" (181). Further, "The virtue theory is the moral foundation of Smith's political economy, political theory, and 'natural jurisprudence.' Hence the virtue theory is closely tied to his doctrine of liberty as well as to his views about the pursuit of wealth. However 'ancient' the virtue theory may in some respects be, Smith combines it with a modern view of the social and political institutions appropriate to virtue" (ibid.). With impressive erudition Griswold argues that "taken together... TMS and WN form complementary parts of a larger whole" (265), and that Smith thinks "the virtues of a free and commercial society" may be defended on the basis of views espoused in WN: skepticism of state interference in economic and social matters, anti-utopianism, and the doctrine of the invisible hand (21). Yet WN does not place blind faith in laissez faire but advocates social justice, compulsory public education and greater taxes on the rich (254, 264, 359).Has Griswold, then, finally solved the Adam Smith Problem? There remains the problem that WN apparently neglects central themes of TMS: sympathy, the impartial spectator, and benevolence. In TMS virtue has distinctive components: "Concern for our own happiness recommends to us the virtue of prudence: concern for that of other people, the virtues of justice and beneficence" (TMS 262). These constitute perfect virtue: "The man who acts according to the rules of perfect... (shrink)

Discusses the sense of separability in Aristotle and how they apply to the separability of mind or nous.

Assesses the presuppositions underlying Aristotle's political theory. The principle of teleology holds that human beings strive to fulfil certain natural ends such as rationality and social cooperation; the principle of perfectionism holds that the good for human beings consists in the attainment of these ends; the principle of community holds that individuals can attain the good only if they are subject to the authority of the community, including the state ; and the principle of rulership holds that the community can (...) function successfully only if order is imposed on it by rational agents. This chapter considers the extent to which these principles may be defended against powerful objections that have been raised by modern philosophers and scientists. Finally, it is pointed out that the modern theory of rights, which assumes a version of extreme individualism, faces serious difficulties, so that Aristotle's theory of rights, based on a moderately individualistic theory of justice, is an alternative still worthy of serious consideration. (shrink)

Aristotle's constitutional theory applies his theory of justice and rights to the unifying institutions of the polis. He defines a citizen as one who has a liberty right to partake in deliberative or judicial office. He distinguishes between constitutions in terms of whether they are correct or deviant and on the basis of whether political rights are assigned to one, few, or many persons––resulting in a six‐fold classification of constitutions: kingship versus tyranny, aristocracy versus oligarchy, and polity versus democracy. In (...) Politics IV, Aristotle develops a more complicated system of classification involving different modes of deliberation, adjudication, and magistracy. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the tasks of politics, including legislation in ideal and realistic situations and reform of defective constitutions. (shrink)

In addition to his study of correct constitutions, Aristotle investigated the entire spectrum of regimes existing in his day. Aristotle believes that it is a proper task for politics and legislation to deal with deviant or imperfect constitutions such as oligarchy and democracy. In seeking to preserve and reform imperfect constitutions and prevent revolution, Aristotle employs a maxim of superiority: that the part of the polis that supports the constitution ought to be superior to the part that does not. Although (...) this maxim can clearly come into conflict with justice, Aristotle regards it as a defensible normative precept when it is the closest feasible approximation to justice that is attainable under adverse circumstances. (shrink)

Justice is central to Aristotle's political theory because he holds that all constitutions are a form of justice. In so far as it is just in the universal sense, the constitution aims at the happiness of the political community; in so far as it is just in the particular sense of distributive justice, the constitution assigns rights to offices, property, or honours to the citizens in accordance with their worth. Aristotle also claims that political justice is partly natural and partly (...) legal, but adds that ‘one constitution only is everywhere according to nature the best’, thus implying that the polis is in a natural condition when it has the best constitution and laws. Aristotle recognizes that justice may exist outside the polis, but he regards political justice as the highest form of justice. (shrink)

Aristotle's politics may be characterized as ‘naturalistic’, in the sense that it assigns a fundamental role to the concept of nature in the explanation and evaluation of the political community. Aristotle's naturalism is summed up in three claims: the polis exists by nature, human beings are by nature political animals, and the polis is by nature prior to the individual. Aristotle has been accused of inconsistency because he also asserts that the human lawgiver brings the polis into existence. This chapter, (...) however, defends Aristotle's theory by arguing that his complex natural teleology permits nature and legislation to be cooperative causes of the political community. Also compares and contrasts his political naturalism with modern theories on the state. (shrink)

Supports Ernest Barker's interpretation that Aristotle offers a ‘vindication of the right of private property.’ Although Aristotle emphasizes the common interests of the citizens, he also provides a place for private property in all of his constitutions, including the best constitution. The chapter argues that Aristotle gives a basic account of property ownership that is similar to modern concepts of property rights. He offers justifications of private property, states conditions under which property may be justly acquired, defends private property against (...) Plato's communism, and argues that property is indispensable for the exercise of citizenship. (shrink)

Although past commentators saw Aristotle as recognizing the rights of individuals, recent interpreters have objected that no single Greek word corresponds to the modern word ‘rights’. In reply, it is shown with evidence from Aristotle and other writers that the ancient Greek discourse of law and politics included distinct locutions corresponding to the different senses of ‘rights’ distinguished by the jurist W. N. Hohfeld: to dikaion corresponds to Hohfeld's claim right, exousia to a liberty or privilege, kurios to authority or (...) power, and adeia and ateleia to immunity. A right for Aristotle is essentially a just claim that a person has against other members of the same community, and a natural right is a just claim based in nature. Recent arguments that rights have theoretical implications inimical to Aristotle's principles are also found to be unpersuasive, because they rely on tendentious assumptions that would rule out many modern theories of rights as well. The chapter also indicates how a respect for the rights of others might be justified on the basis of Aristotelian practical wisdom. (shrink)

Describes Aristotle's life and historical context. Discusses the place of politics––the science of the polis ––within Aristotle's taxonomy of science and of virtue. Provides an overview of Aristotle's argument, emphasizing the role of nature, justice, and rights. Describes the four main presuppositions of Aristotle's argument: natural teleology, perfectionism, community, and rulership. Also distinguishes and explains the different modes of interpretation employed in this book and in other works on the history of political thought.

Aristotle states that ‘there is only one constitution which is everywhere according to nature the best.’ This constitution is unqualifiedly just and ‘according to nature’ because it promotes the common advantage. The interpretation of ‘common advantage’ is problematic: does it consist in the advantage of the citizens considered as distinct individuals or the advantage of the polis considered as a whole? Only on the former, individualistic interpretation would the best constitution be deeply committed to individual rights, and it is argued (...) that a moderate version of individualism is the correct interpretation of Aristotle's best constitution. The chapter goes on to consider difficulties in Aristotle's account of the best constitution, including his views on education and the question of which is better: virtuous kingship or the rule of law. (shrink)

Recognizing that the best or ideal constitution is generally unattainable, Aristotle employs a principle of proximity: although the highest end is best, if it is unattainable, legislation should aim at the result that is closest to the end and thus the best attainable outcome. In politics, this is called the ‘second sailing’, and Aristotle discusses such a constitution under the headings of polity, mixed constitution, and middle constitution. Although this constitution is correct and just, the standard is lowered in the (...) face of necessity. Still, the second‐best constitution serves as a norm for evaluating the various deviant constitutions that are forms of democracy and oligarchy. The second‐best constitution emulates the ideal constitution and it satisfies the maxim of unanimity, which in its strongest form requires that if a constitution is to be preserved, all the citizens should wish that it exist and continue unchanged. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Adam Smith and the Virtues of EnlightenmentFred D. Miller Jr.Charles L. Griswold. Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Pp. xiv + 412. Cloth, $59.95.For over a century, scholars have been vexed by the so-called "Adam Smith problem," which concerns the relationship between the two works which Smith published during his lifetime: The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) in 1759, and An (...) Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (WN) in 1776 (citations are to the Liberty Classics reprints of the Oxford University Press editions). Many have regarded them as discordant: while TMS is apparently concerned with classical ethics, WN seems to assume that humans are basically egoistic, although they can be directed toward the public good by means of the "invisible hand." It is tempting to view Smith as a transitional author: TMS is the swan song of virtue ethics, whereas WN is a pioneering work in a new tradition of political economy.Griswold challenges this temptation in this brilliant study, arguing that Smith had a coherent and integrated philosophical viewpoint encompassing TMS, WN, and other surviving writings. Griswold views Smith as offering a virtue ethics and "throwing in his lot with the ancient moralists" (65). He argues, "We cannot grasp Smith's diagnosis of and therapy for the modern age without devoting considerable attention to his analysis of the virtues (especially the virtue of justice) as well as to the theory of the emotions, of the impartial spectator, and of sympathy" (20). Smith tried to reconcile a traditional ethics with modern skepticism and the new values associated with commercial society and religious secularism. Griswold's book illuminates a wide range of themes in Smith's moral philosophy: his view of rhetoric, method, and system underlying TMS (chapter 1); sympathy and self-interest (chapter 2); moral psychology and the theory of the impartial spectator (chapter 3); Smith's skepticism and reservations about philosophy (chapter 4); virtue theory (chapter 5); justice (chapter 6); the relationship between TMS and WN (chapter 7); and nature versus artifice in ethics (chapter 8). The epilogue critically discusses whether Smith's moral theory falls into subjectivism, and whether [End Page 439] Smith goes too far in excluding philosophers such as Socrates from ordinary moral discourse.A brief review cannot do justice to Griswold's compelling interpretation, and I shall focus on his solution to "the old problem of how the moral theory and the political economy mesh" (21). Griswold argues, "Smith sees himself as synthesizing an ancient view about the nature of virtue with a modern approach to the problem of the source of moral value. Consequently the moral psychology (especially the notions of sympathy and the impartial spectator) and the virtue theory must be understood in light of each other" (181). Further, "The virtue theory is the moral foundation of Smith's political economy, political theory, and 'natural jurisprudence.' Hence the virtue theory is closely tied to his doctrine of liberty as well as to his views about the pursuit of wealth. However 'ancient' the virtue theory may in some respects be, Smith combines it with a modern view of the social and political institutions appropriate to virtue" (ibid.). With impressive erudition Griswold argues that "taken together... TMS and WN form complementary parts of a larger whole" (265), and that Smith thinks "the virtues of a free and commercial society" may be defended on the basis of views espoused in WN: skepticism of state interference in economic and social matters, anti-utopianism, and the doctrine of the invisible hand (21). Yet WN does not place blind faith in laissez faire but advocates social justice, compulsory public education and greater taxes on the rich (254, 264, 359).Has Griswold, then, finally solved the Adam Smith Problem? There remains the problem that WN apparently neglects central themes of TMS: sympathy, the impartial spectator, and benevolence. In TMS virtue has distinctive components: "Concern for our own happiness recommends to us the virtue of prudence: concern for that of other people, the virtues of justice and beneficence" (TMS 262). These constitute perfect virtue: "The man who acts according to the rules of perfect... (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Problems Concerning Aristotle's Ideal Constitution Ideal Theory and Political Practice Criticisms of Previous Ideal Constitutions Aristotle's Ideal State Aristotle Legacy to Ideal Theory Note Bibliography.

This chapter contains sections titled: Aristotle's Relevance General View of Ethics and Politics Ethics Politics Conclusion Acknowledgments References and Recommended Reading.